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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance level and the bankruptcy law for such debt 
variables as firms’ cost of debt and amount (and variation) of debt. Our empirical results are consistent with the 
model's prediction. First, we find that the better the corporate governance, the lower the cost of debt. Second, we 
find that better corporate governance arrangements relate to firms with higher amounts of debt. Finally we find 
that better governance and harsher bankruptcy laws have a positive effect on debt. Moreover, this effect is 
stronger for firms with worse corporate governance, which indicates that the law works as a substitute for 
governance practices to protect creditors' interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of firm-level corporate governance arrangements and of an 
institutional shock - the new Brazilian bankruptcy law - on firms’ balance sheet debt financing 
features. As a proxy for firm-level governance we use the newly developed Brazilian Corporate 
Governance Index [BCGI] (Lopes & Walker, 2007), which scores governance arrangements across 
four dimensions: disclosure; ownership structure; board composition; and shareholder rights(1). The 
BCGI's four dimensions directly affect the level of effort by managers and as such can be used as a 
proxy for moral hazard resolution. This effect presumably reduces agency costs and consequently 
firms' cost of debt. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) find an inverse relation between the cost of debt 
and board independence and size. Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004) show that limited 
transparency of firms' operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to 
alleviate moral hazard problems. More recently, Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Whalen (2007) have shown 
that firms with higher levels of corporate governance have lower information asymmetry around 
quarterly earnings announcements. Our study adds to the previous literature by relating (theoretically 
and empirically) firm-level corporate governance arrangements and an exogenous shock - bankruptcy 
law reform - to the cost of debt and to the amount (and variation) of debt. 
First we develop a model that connects the governance and the bankruptcy law to such debt 
variables as the cost of debt and firms' amount of debt. Through a set of propositions we show that: 
first, corporate governance has a negative impact on the cost of debt and a positive impact on the 
amount of debt; second, a harsher bankruptcy law also has a negative impact on the cost of debt and a 
positive impact on its amount; and, last but not least, the effect of bankruptcy law changes is stronger 
for firms with worse corporate governance standards. 
We then approach the same problem empirically by regressing the debt variables on our measure of 
corporate governance and the bankruptcy reform dummy. To address this issue we use both public 
source balance-sheet microdata from Brazilian firms and a proprietary index for corporate governance 
(BCGI). 
Our results show that: (i) the higher the corporate governance score on the BCGI, the lower the cost 
of debt; and (ii) the effect on changes in the amount of firms' debt considering the new Bankruptcy 
Law is less significant for firms with higher BCGI scores. Hence, we can say that stronger systems of 
corporate governance and bankruptcy procedures contribute to reducing the cost of debt and to 
increasing access to the credit market as well. Moreover, we can state that the reform of Brazil’s 
bankruptcy law has had a stronger effect on firms with lower corporate governance levels. Our 
findings are consistent with our theoretical model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section The Model discusses the theoretical 
model relating corporate governance and the bankruptcy law to the cost of debt and credit availability; 
Section The Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform discusses the reform of Brazil’s bankruptcy law; Section 
Data presents our data set; Section Conclusions presents the empirical results and concludes.  
 
 
THE MODEL  
 
 
In this section we develop a model that describes how corporate governance and the bankruptcy law 
affect debt variables. To develop our model we assume the following: 
Let e  be the effort exerted by the manager. We assume that the effort e  is a function of the level of 
corporate governance of the firm and the degree of punishment imposed by the bankruptcy law: 
,),( bgaLgLe +=   where  0>Le  and .0>ge   
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When we take effort into account, we can assume that the probability of success of the firm 
increases with the firm's governance level and the punishment of the bankruptcy law. In precise terms, 
we assume that )),(( gLep  is differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in the governance 
level, g , that 1)),(( <gLep , where g  is the maximum level of governance as well L  is the maximum 
level of the punishment of the bankruptcy law. This condition means that insolvency is always 
possible due to some idiosyncratic shock, even when gg =  and LL = . 
 
Firms Investment 
 
We make three important assumptions: creditors are imperfect monitors of a firm’s actions related to 
payoffs after it borrows; creditors can predict their mean payoffs in the default state; and creditors and 
the firm are risk-neutral. We make the first assumption because it captures the asymmetric information 
between the firm and its creditors. The second rests on the view that professional creditors have 
considerable experience with default, and the third is more accurate when applied to firms than to 
individual persons. 
The borrowing firm has a project that requires capital,I , which it must raise externally. The firm 
promises to repay creditors the sum,F . The project can return a value,v , where the firm is solvent if 
Fv ≥  and insolvent if Fv < . Two states are possible in the future, one if the firm is solvent and the 
other if it is not. 
The solvency and insolvency states return to the firm v solv  and v ins , respectively, where 
inssolv vFv >≥ . The probability of solvency is )),(( gLep  and the probability of insolvency is 
))),((1( gLep− . This implies that the expected value of the project 
is inssolv vgLepvgLepvE ))),((1()),(()( −+= , the expected return conditional on the solvency state 
is
solvsolv vvE =)( , and the expected return conditional on the insolvency state is insins vvE =)( . 
Assuming that the credit market is competitive, F  is the largest sum that creditors can demand to 
fund the project. We take the risk-free interest rate equal to zero, so that a borrowing firm's interest 
rate is a function only of the riskiness of its project and the properties of the corporate governance 
level. 
Creditors who lend I  should expect to receive I  in return. This expectation can be written as 
follows: 
);)))(,((1()),(( insvgLepFgLepI −+=  
)),((
))))(,((1()1(
gLep
vgLepI
rIF ins−−=+=  
 
(1) 
The firm's interest rate is 1)/( −= IFr , which is increasing in F ; this is the value that the firm is 
required to repay in the solvency state. Denoting by v ins
u
 ( ))1,0(∈uinsv the per-unit-of-investment 
)1( =I  counterparts of v ins  we also have 
[ ],1)),((
)),((1 u
insvgLep
gLep
r −
−
=  
 
(2) 
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( ) ,01)),(( 2 <−′−=
∂
∂ − u
insvbgLepg
r
 
which is decreasing on the level of corporate governance. 
Proposition 1: A higher level of corporate governance reduces the interest rate charged to the 
firm. 
Also, since 
( ) ,01)),(( 2 <−′−=
∂
∂ − u
insvagLepL
r
 
(3) 
the interest rate is decreasing on the level of punishment of the bankruptcy law. 
Proposition 2: Higher punishment of the bankruptcy law reduces the interest rate charged to 
the firm. 
Thus, it is clear from (2) and (3) that the interest rate is decreasing on the degree of governance and 
bankruptcy law punishment. Both limit the agency cost associated with the external finance 
relationship. Moreover, 
( ) .01)),((2 3
2
<−=
∂∂
∂ −′′ u
insvabgLepLg
r
 
Proposition 3: The impact of the bankruptcy law's punishment on interest rate is higher for 
firms with worse corporate governance level. 
That is, for firms with poorer governance, a harsher punishment from the bankruptcy law produces a 
greater reduction in the interest rate. It is possible that a good bankruptcy law works as a substitute for 
a good corporate governance structure to protect outside investors from agency costs. 
An ex ante objective of the firm is to maximize the project option set that creditors want to finance. 
Society prefers firms that pursue projects with positive expected returns. A firm should therefore 
undertake a project that creates value. We denote social welfare as W, so that 
. 0)())),((1()()),((
and 0))))(,((1()),((
≥−−+=
≥−−+=
IvEgLepvEgLepW
IvgLepvgLepW
inssolv
inssolv
 
As social efficiency always requires a minimum conditional expectation value of return, )(vEsolv , 
we let 0=W . Then, 
,)),((
)())),((1()(
gLep
vEgLepI
vE inssolv
−−
=  
(4) 
where )),((/)]())),((1([ gLepvEgLepIF ins−−=  is identical to the right-hand side of )(vEsolv . 
Since equation (1) solves the minimum repayment promise the firm must make to obtain financing 
and equation (4) solves the minimum conditional expected return that is socially accepted, the 
equations show that it is socially efficient for firms to undertake all projects that creditors will finance. 
Debtors will thus be able to fulfill their promises in solvency states, since equation (1) equals equation 
(4). 
Also, we can see that the level of corporate governance and a harsher bankruptcy law exert an effect 
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on the minimum conditional expected return, in the sense that a higher level of governance and/or 
legal punishment reduces it (see equation (5)), which spans the set of financiable projects by the 
creditors 
,0)),(()()( 2 <′−−=
∂
∂ − bgLepvI
g
vE
ins
solv
 
(5) 
.0)),(()()( 2 <′−−=
∂
∂ − agLepvI
L
vE
ins
solv
 
(6) 
Thus far, we have considered the set of projects to be financed. We now examine borrowers' 
incentives to invest. The interest rate imposes the expected costs on firms, so the firm's expected 
return, when it borrows, becomes 
[ ] .0)()),(()(
;0)0)))(,((1()))(,(()(
≥−=
≥−+−=
FvEgLepRE
gLepFvgLepRE
solv
B
solv
B
 
(7) 
Substituting for F  from equation 1 yields 
,0)())),((1()()),(()( ≥−−+= IvEgLepvEgLepRE inssolvB  
which is the expression indicating that the project is socially efficient. This equation holds with 
equality for the minimum conditional expected return, ).(vEsolv  Therefore, the borrower invests in all 
projects that creditors will finance. 
Proposition 4: Higher level of corporate governance increases the equilibrium level of debt. 
Proposition 5: A harsher bankruptcy law increases the equilibrium level of debt. 
Proposition 6: The impact of the bankruptcy law's punishment on the equilibrium level of debt 
is higher for firms with worse corporate governance level. 
 
 
THE BRAZILIAN BANKRUPTCY REFORM 
 
 
Lawmakers began efforts to update the country's corporate insolvency legislation in 1993. The 
original bill underwent several amendments before the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of 
Congress) finally approved it in October 2003. The bill was then sent to the Senate, which introduced 
further improvements to the new law before approving it in July 2004. The Chamber then approved 
the Senate's version in December 2004, and the final law went into force in June, 2005. This section 
outlines the characteristics of Brazil's former law, the main changes introduced in the reform and the 
potential future effects on the Brazilian economy. 
 
The Former Brazilian Bankruptcy Law 
 
The former legal framework for corporate insolvency in Brazil was very fragmented, with the core 
legislation for bankruptcy proceedings enacted in 1945. Bankruptcy law regulates both liquidation and 
reorganization proceedings for merchants (i.e., legal entities that engage in commerce in their usual 
course of conduct). State-owned corporations and government-private corporations (mixed-economy 
companies) were excluded from bankruptcy proceedings until 31 October, 2001, when an amendment 
allowed the bankruptcy of the mixed-economy companies. 
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Despite providing both proceedings and aiming to prevent or avoid the liquidation of enterprises, in 
practice the insolvency process was ineffective at maximizing asset values and protecting creditor 
rights in liquidation (which raised the cost of capital). The insolvency proceeding was very slow, 
taking ten years on average to complete the whole process. Liquidation was marked by severe 
inefficiencies, and the reorganization process was obsolete and too rigid to provide meaningful 
rehabilitation options for modern business. 
The process of disposing of assets was also slow and highly ineffective, owing to court and 
procedural inefficiency, lack of transparency and the so-called succession problem, whereby tax, labor 
and other liabilities were transferred to the buyer of a liquidated firm or asset, which reduced the 
market value of an insolvent company's assets. In addition, the priority given to labor and tax claims 
had the practical effect of eliminating any protection for other creditors. The process led to an informal 
use of the system to promote consensual workouts, although an insufficient legislative framework also 
hampered them(2). 
There were several consequences of the shortcomings of the former Brazilian legal and institutional 
system concerning insolvency. Creditors' rights were only weakly protected and financial markets 
were characterized by a relatively low credit volume and high interest rates. The ratio of private credit 
to GDP was only 35 percent and the interest rate spread was 49 percent on average from 1997 to 2002. 
 
The New Bankruptcy Law 
 
The new liquidation procedure introduced six key changes. First, labor credits are limited to an 
amount equaling 150 times the minimum monthly wage. Second, secured credits are given priority 
over tax credits. Third, unsecured credits are given priority over some of the tax credits. Fourth, the 
firm is sold (preferably as a whole) before the creditors' list is constituted, which speeds up the process 
and increases the value of the bankruptcy estate. Fifth, tax, labor, and other liabilities are no longer 
transferred to the buyer of an enterprise sold in liquidation. Finally, any new credit extended during 
the reorganization process is given first priority in the event of liquidation. All these factors tend to 
increase creditors' returns in the insolvency state as well as the chance of successful reorganization, 
which reduces the cost of debt and increases the amount of loans(3). 
Brazil's new reorganization procedure was inspired by Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Whereas the previous law did not permit any renegotiation between the interested parties and only a 
few of parties were entitled to recover their assets, now a sweeping proposal for recuperation must be 
accepted by workers, secured creditors and unsecured creditors (including trade creditors). After the 
recuperation plan is approved by the creditors, the court appoints an administrator to conduct the 
reorganization procedure. 
In the new law, creditors play a more significant role than previously, including negotiating and 
voting for the reorganization plan. The new law introduced two changes to increase the chance of a 
successful reorganization. First, firms are given an automatic stay of 180 days, during which creditors 
cannot seize any of the firm's goods or assets, even those given as collateral. The goal of this provision 
is not to disturb the firm’s activities while management develops a proposal. Second, credit that is 
given to a reorganizing firm in the post-bankruptcy period has priority over older credits in the event 
of liquidation. This change seeks to motivate creditors to make new loans with better terms and to 
reduce the indirect cost of insolvency. 
It should be noted that the new reorganization procedure reduces to zero the gains of the manager in 
states of insolvency, since they are excluded from the firm’s operation. Furthermore, several 
modifications in liquidation and reorganization procedures should reduce the cost of capital for firms 
in the economy. This widens the gap between returns in the solvency and insolvency states, producing 
a positive final effect on managers' effort, reducing the moral hazard problem. To see this effect, let 
v solv
 and F  be the pre-reform values of the firm's return and creditors' payment in the solvency state 
and v solv  and FR  be the post-reform values. Let l  be the amount that managers gain in the old 
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bankruptcy procedure. Thus, from the managers’ perspective we have: 
[ ]
.
1)(
)()(1))(()(max
lFv
ep
elepFvepRE
solv
privsolv
solv
B
e
−−
=
−−+−=
′
 
From the post-reform managers’ perspective we have: 
[ ]
.
1)(
)0()(1))(()(max
R
solv
privsolv
solv
R
solvsolv
B
e
Fv
ep
eepFvepRE
−
=
−−+−=
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If the changes in the bankruptcy law are such that lFvFv solv
R
solv −−>−  ( where )FF R < , then 
)()/(1)/(1)( RR epFvlFvep ′=−>−−=′ , and therefore eeR > . In other words, given these 
changes, managers’ efforts are stronger than in the pre-reform period. 
Fraud in bankruptcy is another key issue addressed in the new law. The first, second, and third 
changes to liquidation cited above (that is, limiting labor credits and prioritizing secured credits over 
tax credits, and unsecured credits over some tax credits), as well as the heightened role of creditors in 
reorganization, provide incentives against fraud in the bankruptcy proceeding. The limitation on labor 
credits (up to 150 times the minimum wage) reduces the possibility that a manager will try to cheat the 
law by creating highly paid jobs for friends so as to receive payments from the failing firm. Giving 
secured credits a higher priority than tax and labor claims as a way to increase creditors' recovery in 
case of bankruptcy, along with the more important role of creditors in reorganization, raises their 
incentives to monitor the bankruptcy process, mitigating fraudulent actions. The old law contained 
several grounds for indictment for fraud, but they were not cumulative and each one carried a 
maximum two-year penalty. Since the judicial process was very slow, most penalties became time-
barred(4), meaning that there was always the possibility of no punishment at all. Under the new law, the 
two-year penalties run concurrently and the judicial procedure is much faster, so the cost of fraud is 
expected to increase considerably. Another important change in the new law is that all fraud cases are 
dealt with directly according to the criminal procedure code, which is much more punitive than the 
special bankruptcy crime law. Moreover, since private creditors expect to receive more under the new 
law, they will be watching the judicial bankruptcy proceedings closely and they will most likely be 
important allies in enforcing fraud penalties. 
 
 
DATA 
 
 
As a proxy for firm-specific corporate governance arrangements, we used the Brazilian Corporate 
Governance Index [BCGI]. The BCGI (Lopes & Walker, 2007) is built on fifteen questions based on 
public sources, which measure (binary answers -- 0 for bad or 1 for good) four governance attributes: 
(i) disclosure, (ii) board composition and functioning, (iii) ownership structure and control, (iv) 
shareholder rights(5). The BCGI was constructed using public sources related to all Brazilian public 
companies over the years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. Additionally, we collected firm-specific 
accounting data for the same period. 
We considered firm debt to be the balance sheet short-term and long-term debt plus the accounts 
payable to suppliers. The cost of debt is calculated as a total year's interest expense for each firm 
divided by its mean debt over the same period(6). We also used the amount of assets, industry dummies 
and macroeconomic data to control our analysis. The data were obtained from both the Economatica 
database and Ipeadata(7). 
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Empirical Approach 
 
To investigate the relationship between corporate governance level and such credit variables as the 
cost of debt and level of debt (long-term, long-term and aggregate), we estimated the following 
equation: 
,)( uxfy +=  
such that 0)/( =xuE  and ,)/( 2 ∞<xuE  implying that ).()/( xfxyE =  Thus, an estimation for )(xf  
gives us an estimator of the expectation of y  conditional on x.   
To do this, we regressed the dependent variables (cost of debt (kd), total debt(8) (DEBT), short-term 
debt (SHORT-TERM DEBT), long-term debt (LONG-TERM DEBT), variation of debt (VDEBT), 
variation of short-term debt (SHORT-TERM VDEBT) and variation of long-term debt (LONG-TERM 
VDEBT)) on corporate the governance level (BCGI) and other control variables. We reported the 
results using the following specifications:  
.)(1 itititit BCGIy εβα +++= Xβ  (8) 
In this specification, the vector of control variables is composed of per capita Gross Intern Product 
[GIP], the risk-free Brazilian interest rate (SELIC) and the exchange rate with the dollar (PTAX) to 
capture the macroeconomic variations over the years. We also used total firm assets (ASSETS) to 
control for the firm’s size and dummies for each industry sector as defined by Economática to capture 
the characteristics of each sector that may influence the dependent variable(9). This procedure is 
consistent with the conjecture of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that the scope for moral hazard is greater 
for managers of firms with more volatile operating environments. Brazilian firms within the same 
industry presumably face a similar operating environment. 
The second question we addressed was: Are firms with worse corporate governance more strongly 
affected by the new bankruptcy law than those with better corporate governance? To answer this 
question, we regressed all the debt variables on the interaction between the corporate governance 
index and a dummy representing the implementation of the new bankruptcy law (dBL t : 0 pre-new 
bankruptcy law and 1 afterward), the corporate index and the bankruptcy law dummy alone and the 
controls defined earlier. The specification was:  
.)()()( 321 itittittitit dBLBCGIdBLBCGIy εβββα ++⋅+++= Xβ  (9) 
 
Results: Cost of Debt 
 
To estimate the effect of the corporate governance at a firm level, represented by the equation (8), 
we regressed the cost of debt on the corporate governance index and a set of controls.  
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Table 1: POLS Regression: Cost of Debt 
 
 
Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Error P-Value 
Intercept 10.357 26.092 0.691 
BCGI -0.563 0.203 0.006 
GIP -1.957 5.198 0.707 
PTAX 0.109 0.154 0.480 
SELIC 0.001 0.002 0.728 
ASSETS 0.008 0.005 0.120 
Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Error P-Value 
Intercept 36.148 35.985 0.315 
BCGI -0.599 0.222 0.007 
BANKRPT_LAW 
-0.311 0.303 0.305 
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW 0.245 0.491 0.618 
GIP -7.092 7.170 0.323 
PTAX -0.086 0.246 0.726 
SELIC 0.003 0.003 0.326 
ASSETS 0.008 0.005 0.127 
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable:  kd 
This table presents the results of pooled cross section robust regressions of the cost of debt (kd) on BCGI
(panel A) and BCGI interacting with the new bankruptcy law (panel B). The new bankruptcy law 
(BANKRPT_LAW) is a dummy variable codified as 0 before 2005 and 1 after 2005. In both regression we 
controll
ed 
for macroeconomic variables as exchange rate (PTAX), GIP, Brazilian risk-free interest rate 
(SELIC), and for firm size (ASSETS) and industry dummies. Industry dummies coefficients are not reported.
Cost of debt is winsorized at 2.5%. 
Panel A: Pooled Cross Section Regression 
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable:  kd 
Panel B: Pooled Cross Section Regressions 
 
Note: Standard Errors and Covariance Robust to Heteroskedasticity.  
 
Panel A, which reports the regression results, shows that firms with higher levels of corporate 
governance present lower debt costs. This is in line with the theory (see proposition 1). Furthermore, 
we can say that an increase of 1% in the BCGI reduces the cost of debt by 0.5%. Panel B, which adds 
the effect of the introduction of the new bankruptcy law, represented by equation (9), shows that even 
considering this institutional shock, corporate governance still matters and the change in the BCGI 
coefficient is marginal. Additionally the effect of the new law and its interaction with the corporate 
governance level were not statistically significant. 
 
Results: Amount of Debt 
 
Table 2 presents the effect of the corporate governance at the firm level on the amount of 
indebtedness variables (DEBT, SHORT-TERM DEBT and LONG-TERM DEBT), regressing these 
variables on the corporate governance index and a set of controls. Table2, Panel A, which reports the 
regression results for the total amount of debt, shows that firms with a higher level of corporate 
governance obtain higher loan amounts. Additionally, we can say that an increase of 1% in the BCGI 
increases firms' debt amount by 2.43%. Table 2, Panels B and C, shows that the result holds when we 
partition our dependent variable into both short-term and long-term debt. Note that all the results 
concerning the variable amount of debt agree with the theory described above (see proposition 4). 
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Table 2: POLS Regression: Amount of Debt 
 
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 12.118 45.805 0.791
BCGI 2.428 0.350 0.000
GIP -0.410 9.116 0.964
PTAX 0.070 0.276 0.799
SELIC 0.000 0.004 0.908
ASSETS 0.048 0.009 0.000
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 10.541 43.558 0.809
BCGI 2.345 0.332 0.000
GIP -0.193 8.668 0.982
PTAX 0.111 0.262 0.671
SELIC 0.000 0.004 0.934
ASSETS 0.043 0.008 0.000
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 18.991 55.448 0.732
BCGI 1.728 0.406 0.000
GIP -1.956 11.035 0.859
PTAX 0.108 0.336 0.748
SELIC 0.001 0.005 0.831
ASSETS 0.051 0.010 0.000
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: SHORT-TERM CREDIT
Panel C: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - Long-Term Credit
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: LONG-TERM CREDIT
This table presents the results of pooled cross section robust regressions of the firm's credit on BCGI. Panel A 
present results for total credit, while tables B and C present results partitioning by short-term and long-term
credit received by the companies. We control for macroeconomic variables as exchange rate (PTAX), GIP,
Brazilian risk-free interest rate (SELIC), and for firm size (ASSETS) and industry dummies. Industry
dummies coefficients are not reported. CREDIT represents the natural logarithm of firms credit.
Panel A: Pooled Cross Section Regression
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: CREDIT
Panel B: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - Short-Term Credit
 
Note: Standard Errors and Covariance Robust to Heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 3, Panel A, presents the effect of bankruptcy law reform by itself and its interaction with the 
BCGI on the amount of firms' debt. We still expect an increase in the amount of debt due to better 
corporate governance practices (see proposition 4). Furthermore, we also expect a positive effect of 
the bankruptcy reform on debt variables and a negative effect of the interacted variable on the amount 
of debt (see proportions 5 and 6, respectively). Once again, our results confirm the positive effect of 
the BCGI on the amount of aggregate debt, short-term and long-term debt. However, the effect of 
bankruptcy law reform is not significant at the 5% level except for the interaction variable relating the 
BCGI and the law on long-term debt. This result is consistent with the idea that the debt market is 
more accessible to firms with better BCGI levels. Thus the level of debt tends to increase further for 
this group.  
 
Interactions between Corporate Governance, Bankruptcy Law and Firms' Debt Financing: the 
Brazilian Case 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 5, n. 3, art. 5, p. 245-259, July/Sept. 2008 www.anpad.org.br/bar 
255
Table 3: POLS Regression: Amount of Debt 
 
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept -22.110 68.160 0.746
BCGI 2.236 0.384 0.000
BANKRPT_LAW -0.324 0.526 0.538
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW 1.602 0.836 0.055
GIP 6.416 13.572 0.636
PTAX 0.330 0.469 0.482
SELIC -0.003 0.007 0.659
ASSETS 0.047 0.009 0.000
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 5.260 64.723 0.935
BCGI 2.189 0.366 0.000
BANKRPT_LAW -0.436 0.505 0.388
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW 1.261 0.772 0.102
GIP 0.866 12.887 0.946
PTAX 0.152 0.446 0.733
SELIC 0.000 0.006 0.978
ASSETS 0.042 0.008 0.000
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept -95.874 77.849 0.218
BCGI 1.432 0.434 0.001
BANKRPT_LAW 0.096 0.657 0.884
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW 2.242 1.116 0.045
GIP 20.937 15.499 0.177
PTAX 0.980 0.537 0.069
SELIC -0.010 0.007 0.169
ASSETS 0.049 0.010 0.000
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: LONG-TERM CREDIT
Panel B: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - 
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: CREDIT
This table presents the results of pooled cross section robust regressions of the the firm's credit on BCGI and
BCGI interacting with the new bankruptcy law. The new bankruptcy law (BANKRPT_LAW) is a dummy
variable codified as 0 before 2005 and 1 after 2005. We control for macroeconomic variables as exchange
rate (PTAX), GIP, Brazilian risk-free interest rate (SELIC), and for firm size (ASSETS) and industry
dummies. Industry dummies coefficients are not reported. CREDIT represents the natural logarithm of firms
credit.
Panel B: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - Short-Term Credit
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: SHORT-TERM CREDIT
Panel C: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - Long-Term Credit
 
Note: Standard Errors and Covariance Robust to Heteroskedasticity. 
 
However, to analyze the theory that bankruptcy law reform and interaction between the legal reform 
and BCGI have positive and negative effects on the amount of debt, respectively, we also have to look 
at the variation of the debt and not only the impact on its level, since the variation is more sensitive to 
shocks because it is a flow variable instead of a stock variable. In this case, we expect that the increase 
in the level of debt should be relatively higher for firms with a lower level of governance (see 
proposition 3 and 6). Table 4 reports our results on this matter. 
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Table 4: POLS Regression: Variation in the Amount of Debt 
 
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 17.500.000 3.291.665 0.000
BCGI 423.738 100.615 0.000
BANKRPT_LAW 407.183 102.411 0.000
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW -44.562 287.880 0.877
GIP -3.439.031 661.673 0.000
SELIC 1.029 290 0.000
ASSETS 11.158 3.178 0.000
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 7.791.706 1.722.449 0.000
BCGI 172.152 57.224 0.003
BANKRPT_LAW 215.068 49.964 0.000
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW -281.304 123.845 0.023
GIP -1.537.866 345.858 0.000
SELIC 497 149 0.001
ASSETS 3.342 1.313 0.011
Coefficient
Robust Standard
Error P-Value
Intercept 7.126.857 2.060.482 0.001
BCGI 248.456 64.446 0.000
BANKRPT_LAW 168.716 67.763 0.013
BCGI*BANKRPT_LAW 157.569 191.020 0.410
GIP -1.398.760 414.776 0.001
SELIC 362 183 0.047
ASSETS 6.004 2.204 0.007
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: LONG-TERM VCREDIT
Panel B: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - 
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: VCREDIT
This table presents the results of pooled cross section robust regressions of the the firm's change on credit
(VCREDIT) on BCGI and BCGI interacting with the new bankruptcy law. The new bankruptcy law
(BANKRPT_LAW) is a dummy variable codified as 0 before 2005 and 1 after 2005. We control for
macroeconomic variables as exchange rate (PTAX), GIP, Brazilian risk-free interest rate (SELIC), and for
firm size (ASSETS) and industry dummies. Industry dummies coefficients are not reported. VCREDIT
represents the change on credit from year t-1 to year t and is winsorized at 2.5%. PTAX is excluded due to
collinearity.
Panel B: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - Short-Term change on Credit
Coefficients from Pooled Regression - dependent variable: SHORT-TERM VCREDIT
Panel C: Pooled Cross Section Regressions - Long-Term change on Credit
 
Note: Standard Errors and Covariance Robust to Heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 4 presents the results when we consider as a dependent variable the variation of the amount of 
debt, using the same set of independent variables. Note that for short-term debt variation the empirical 
findings are totally consistent with the theory described above (see propositions 4, 5 and 6), since both 
the governance and the bankruptcy reform have positive and significant effects on debt variation, 
while the interacted variable has a negative effect. This means that better governance and a harsher 
bankruptcy law have a positive effect on debt. Moreover, this effect is stronger for firms with worse 
corporate governance, which indicates that the law works as a substitute for governance practices to 
protect creditors' interests. The same results holds for the debt-variation variable (long-term plus short-
term) and long-term debt variation variable, except for the interacted variable, which was not 
significant, indicating that the bankruptcy reform did not provide a second-order effect on firms with 
worse corporate governance. One possible explanation for this finding is that long-term debt is usually 
collateralized, which is a natural substitute for bad corporate governance. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The objective of this paper was to add new empirical findings to the literature on corporate 
governance. Anderson et al. (2004) found an inverse relation between the cost of debt and board 
independence and size as well as evidence of significantly lower cost of debt financing for firms with 
fully independent audit committees. Our paper contributes to prior research in the sense that we 
developed a simple model and test our propositions that relate corporate governance and bankruptcy 
law reform to the cost of debt and to changes in the amount of debt. Additionally, we found more 
general results than previous studies when we used the BCGI, which considers disclosure, ownership 
structure, board composition and shareholder rights in its computation. We also considered an 
exogenous shock, the bankruptcy law reform implemented in Brazil in 2005, which considerably 
changed creditors’ rights. 
After the theoretical approach, we sought to verify our predictions on firms' debt empirically. Our 
empirical results were consistent with the model's prediction. First we found that the higher the 
corporate governance score on the BCGI, the lower the cost of debt. Second, we found that better 
corporate governance arrangements relate to firms with higher debt amounts. Finally, we found that 
better governance and a harsher bankruptcy law have a positive effect on debt. Moreover, this effect is 
stronger for firms with worse corporate governance, which indicates that the law works as a substitute 
for governance practices to protect creditors' interests. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1
 For details see Appendix A. 
2
 A workout is an informal renegotiation of loans that takes place outside the courts. 
3
 See Araujo, A. & Funchal B. (2005). Bankruptcy law in Latin America: past and future. Journal Economia - The Journal of 
the Latin America and Caribbean Economic Association, 6(1), 149-216, and Araujo, A. & Funchal B. (2006). Nova lei de 
falências brasileira e seu papel no desenvolvimento do mercado de crédito. Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 36(2), 209-
254. 
4
 In legal parlance, the limitation period was not tolled during the bankruptcy proceeding. 
5
 See Appendix A for details. 
6
 The cost of debt variable was Winsorized at the level of 2.5%. The Winsor procedure is commonly used to treat the outlier 
problem, frequent in this variable. 
7
 Ipeadata. Retrieved  July 16, 2007, from http://www.ipeadata.gov.br 
8
 We used the natural logarithm as a dependent variable in our specification of credit because its distribution is skewed to the 
right. 
9
 Given that industry dummies are the only control used in our analysis, their coefficient results are suppressed in all tables of 
results. 
10
 All answers were obtained from public sources. This questionnaire was not sent to the companies. A score of one is given 
to aspects considered to be good governance and 0 to bad governance. Firms' individual scores will range from 0 to 15. The 
answers were obtained from all Brazilian public companies for the years 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. This questionnaire was 
first used by Carvalhal-da-Silva, A. L., & Leal, R. P. C. (2005). Corporate governance index: firm valuation and performance 
in Brazil. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 3(1), 1-18. 
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APPENDIX: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
 
Brazilian Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) Questionnaire(10) 
 
. DISCLOSURE (BCGIdisc) 
. Does the company publish its financial statements by the required date? 
. Does the company publish its financial statements according to international standards (US-GAAP 
or IFRS)? 
. Is the company audited by one of the big five accounting firms? 
 
. BOARD COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONING (BCGI board) 
. Are the Chairman of the Board and the CEO not the same person? 
. Is the Board not primarily composed of insiders? 
. Is the size of the Board between 5 and 9 members as suggested by the Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance? 
. Do the members of the Board have consecutive one-year terms as suggested by the Brazilian 
Institute of Corporate Governance? 
. Does the company have a permanent Audit Committee? 
 
. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CONTROL (BCGIprop) 
. Do the controlling shareholders own less than fifty percent of the voting shares? 
. Is the percentage of voting shares higher than eighty percent of the total? 
. Is the ratio between cash flow rights and voting rights higher than 1? 
. Is the free float larger or equal to what is required by the São Paulo Stock Exchange New 
Market (25%)? 
 
. SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS (BCGIrights) 
. Does the company statute establish arbitrage as a way to solve conflicts? 
. Does the company statute establish rights in addition to what is required by the Law? 
. Does the company gives tag along rights beyond what is required by the Law? 
